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Other: Beauvoir’s Existential Feminism
Abstract
Simone De Beauvoir considered The Second Sex to be more of a “reflection,” rather than a war-cry or how-to
book for women to follow. The existentialism it contained is there simply because Beauvoir herself identified
with the approach of experience being the common core of self-discovery. In truth, existentialism is quite
possibly the only school of philosophical thought that adequately allows for an in-depth examination of what
being a woman means. The language of existentialism is, in fact, the only approach that proves useful in
approaching a discussion of feminism. While Beauvoir’s influences and interests tended toward an existential
view, it is doubtful that she forced or bent the struggle for equality for women into that particular mold.
Instead, she rightfully sees the connection between the feminine experience and the necessity of taking
responsibility. Beauvoir’s sole point is not that woman should ask to be equal; instead, she advocates a woman
approaching her life as if she simply is – something Beauvoir evinced for herself, proving the possibility. In The
Second Sex, noted philosopher and feminist Simone De Beauvoir used the Hegelian term “other” to cut to the
heart of the feminine psyche, and Beauvoir’s existentialist purview has been adopted by modern feminists in
part because the language of existentialism perfectly conveys the female struggle for equality.
Cover Page Footnote
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In 1998 news of an illicit affair between then-President Bill Clinton and intern Monica Lewinsky 
dominated newspaper headlines and provided endless fodder for both television talking heads 
and late-night comedians.  Clinton, who had purposely worked to draw favorable allusions 
between himself and John F. Kennedy became embroiled in the sort of image-destroying 
disgrace that JFK, in a different time, had adroitly side-stepped; whereas the late president’s 
infidelities were whispered about and hinted at, Clinton’s were laid bare.  For months, the 
country was saturated in minute details: she kept the dress! The dress was blue! It contained a 
tell-tale amount of ejaculate. In truth, the nation fascinated in the story, perhaps because the base 
scenario bordered on the trite, typical and almost scripted: older, powerful man and the young, 
starry-eyed naïf engaged in the sort of extra-curricular workplace romps which are salacious and 
titillating simply because they are forbidden.  But Clinton and Lewinsky were not the only key 
players in the disgrace: First Lady, Hillary Rodham Clinton and Lewinsky’s poorly-chosen 
confidante, Linda Tripp, were front and center as well.  Together and separately, these four, 
central individuals became something of a microcosmic universe, and served to illustrate on a 
large scale the balance of power, gender, and sex in politics – and America.   
Were we to remove the official titles, however, and unsurprisingly, the “roles” played 
remain the same, and what may be most interesting in what we take away is that three of the four 
prominent players were women, and none of them fared well to the public.  In the wake of the 
Lewinsky scandal, gender roles and perceptions were illuminated in an ugly light, showing us 
how women were – and still may be – perceived.  As the lone male in the equation, but without 
doubt at least fifty percent as culpable as Lewinsky herself, Bill Clinton fared well enough; while 
he may have been embarrassed and the very real threat of impeachment may have hung over his 
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head, arguably Clinton, halfway through his second presidency, had very little of any real import 
to lose.   
The same cannot be said for the women involved.  Public opinion slotted each of them 
neatly into archetypal positions that were easily identifiable to a country with an attention span 
best suited to tabloid reading and sound bytes.  Lewinsky was, in turn, the innocent taken 
advantage of, and the scheming Other Woman who used her body for glory and gain.  The First 
Lady, never a media darling, was either the “Cold Bitch” whose starved husband had no choice 
but to seek comfort elsewhere, or – seemingly worse – alleged to be a closeted lesbian.  Linda 
Tripp seems to have gotten off easily, and was simply the gossipy friend, out for revenge.  While 
none of these women came through unscathed, the damage to Hillary Clinton and Linda Tripp is 
negligible in comparison to Lewinsky who was, at the time, in her early twenties; still an 
impressionable age, particularly for women, when self-image is formed but not cemented.  
Lewinsky’s physical appearance was constantly at issue.  Typically, she was characterized as 
being neither thin nor pretty enough to be a presidential mistress – once again, a reference to the 
previously noted Clinton-crafted allusion to JFK and Marilyn Monroe; where Monroe was 
curvaceous and zaftig, Lewinsky was merely fat.  Seemingly, every detail of her life was up for 
debate and open to judgment; Lewinsky recalls tuning in to a morning talk show and hearing no 
less than Erica Jong discussing whether or not she had stage three gum disease.    
While we may look back on the Lewinsky scandal and note that it almost – but not quite 
– toppled a sitting president; calls for the impeachment and resignation of Bill Clinton were by 
no means widespread, but might be seen as a harbinger of the partisan politics we see on a larger 
scale today.  Instead, the Lewinsky scandal demonstrates a failure on the part of feminism.  The 
wholesale disenfranchisement and dismissal of women by relegation to “role” based on gender is 
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nothing new.  Historically, women have been set apart from men via physical, emotional, and 
mental parameters – but choose to separate from each other.  In The Second Sex, noted 
philosopher and feminist Simone De Beauvoir used the Hegelian term “other” to cut to the heart 
of the feminine psyche, and Beauvoir’s existentialist purview has been adopted by modern 
feminists in part because the language of existentialism perfectly conveys the female struggle for 
equality.  
A Reluctant Philosopher 
Beauvoir admitted to Margaret Simons in a 1979 interview that her The Second Sex was 
written purely from her own experiences (337), but chafed at the notion she had written any sort 
of feminist philosophy: “Spinoza, Hegel, or Sartre [are philosophers]; someone who has built a 
great system… A philosopher is somebody who builds… truly builds a great system, and that I 
did not do” (338). This denial on Beauvoir’s part is not borne of any sort of modesty (false or 
otherwise).  She considered The Second Sex to be a “reflection,” rather than a war-cry how-to 
book for women to follow.  The existentialism contained therein is simply because Beauvoir 
herself identified with the approach of experience being the common core of self-discovery.   In 
truth, existentialism is quite possibly the only school of philosophical thought that adequately 
allows for an in-depth examination of what being a woman means.   
Deirdre Bair in Simone De Beauvoir: a Biography entitles with sly irony a chapter 
exploring Beauvoir’s early life, “The Girl with a Man’s Brain,” though there is more to it than 
clever word-play: although the young Beauvoir was part of the French Bourgeoisie through her 
lineage, her immediate family was not particularly well-off.  Her father educated Beauvoir, in 
part to prepare her for the life of a young French girl whose family lacked the funds for a dowry 
(Bair 27).  Her formative years were indeed a rich field of exploration for Beauvoir, but one 
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might be cautious in making inference: there is no evidence to suggest Beauvoir’s father, 
Georges, desired a son.  Rather, he was practically educating Beauvoir for an eventual reality.  
Beauvoir’s earliest education was in-line with that of male children of the time.  Consistently, 
Beauvoir admits in interviews that the “typical” woman’s experience of the time – traditional 
marriage and children -- was really never something she craved, but rather something she felt a 
need to avoid.   
“Other”: Beauvoir Defines Woman In Men’s Terms 
 In order to grasp the connectedness of Beauvoir’s existentialist feminism, a clear and 
fundamental definition of the base terms must be given.  Hence, the Oxford English Dictionary 
defines existentialism as, “A philosophical theory or approach that emphasizes the existence of 
the individual person as a free and responsible agent determining their own development through 
acts of the will,” and feminism as “The advocacy of women’s rights on the grounds of political, 
social, and economic equality to men.”  From the first, the two definitions may seem at odds with 
each other.  Women, as Beauvoir notes, are typically defined by men, leaving them little 
opportunity to progress through their own actions.  Central to this is Beauvoir’s use of “Other” 
for women.  Used in the Hegelian sense, “Other” refers to the opposite of what one is attempting 
to define.  Much is made of Beauvoir’s initial definition of woman early on in The Second Sex.  
When Beauvoir opines, “Woman? Very simple, say the fanciers of simple formulas: she is a 
womb, an ovary: she is a female – this word is sufficient to define her” (3).  While unfairly 
characterized as something of an indictment against masculine constraints, Beauvoir is getting at 
something deeper: this language defines woman in biological terms, and nothing more.  Woman, 
as per Beauvoir, has been typified and termed by what her body is capable of bringing forth and 
little else, but there is nothing inherently sexist in this characterization, and we see this same 
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classic depiction of women throughout the span of history: fertility goddesses in primitive art are 
impossibly voluptuous, alluding to the bounty of agricultural harvest and the all-important 
blessing of the sons that they bring.  Greco-Roman artwork and statuary tend to be more realistic 
in their portrayals, but the emphasis on feminine curves remains.  Beauvoir’s definition of 
woman as the sum of her parts, so to speak, holds true historically.  But Beauvoir, herself, is not 
necessarily scoffing at this interpretation: the human woman simply is capable of gestating and 
bearing offspring; she is simply employing the concept of “Other” with the broadest strokes 
possible.  
It is later in the definition that Beauvoir makes what can be construed as an emphatic 
statement about how women are viewed in her use of “fanciers of simple formulas.”  One of the 
simple joys of reading Beauvoir is coming to the conclusion that, in a classically French way, she 
has said much but used few words to do so, and this statement is impossibly droll: one may 
interpret “simple formulas” to mean that either the formulas or the fanciers are unsophisticated 
and their tastes and intellects facile.  Further, she notes that man embraces his animal nature, but 
uses the animality of woman as an “epithet,”as that man derogatorily projects the behavior of 
insect and animal females onto human women (3-4). She is setting herself up to explore what 
happens when the “platitudes” and pretense regarding what it means to be female drop away, but 
something more exists within the reference of various, purely animal behaviors: animals have 
been conquered and are used by man (in the sense of “mankind,”) and to his own ends.  In the 
same way, man believes he has conquered woman, as well.  When we remember that everyone 
from Aristotle to Descartes placed man firmly at the apex of the animal kingdom, the female is 
close – but just misses.   
Beauvoir: on Female Sexuality 
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Beauvoir’s hint towards woman’s secondary status is additionally clarified when she 
discusses the sexual language men employ, and the force inherent within.  To wit: “Even when 
she is willing, provocative, it is unquestionably the male who takes the female – she is taken” 
(21).  Though we note that woman is defined by her biology to be “Other” to man, she is also 
hindered by her biology and anatomical make up.  Through the act of penetration, Beauvoir sees 
the female as once again subservient to the male, and she is violated internally.  Because the 
female anatomy plays a role in naming what woman is (as well as what she is not,) the act of 
(even willing) sexual congress is invasive to both the female body and psyche.  In male/female, 
reproductive sexual intercourse, at no point is the male traditionally “entered” by the female.  
This allows him, according to Beauvoir, to remain aloof and above the act; he has shared nothing 
from the inside (22).   
Is there a grain of truth to Beauvoir’s assertion that the male lacks an emotional 
investment or internalization with respect to sex? While modern males are encouraged to “feel 
their feelings” and be more expressive, it would be fundamentally flawed to assume that all men, 
throughout all time, were emotionally distant with respect to the aspects of the sexual act. 
Primarily, we have no way of proving such a thing, and anyone who has ever read the Roman 
poet Catullus’s erotic poems to his beloved Lesbia would immediately disagree.  Moreover, in 
discounting the range of feeling within men on a broad, generalized scale, we become willful 
hypocrites and reduce men to the same “animal” status that Beauvoir claims is thrust upon 
women.   
One must note, however, that much of what Beauvoir bases some of these ruminations on 
is in direct response to the theories and psychoanalytic techniques of Sigmund Freud.  Because 
most (if not all) of Freud’s work has recently come under intense and unfavorable scrutiny, 
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Beauvoir’s concession to the “validity” of some of his theories is, of course, wrong.  Freud 
himself was keen on the concept of “hysteria” -- a frequently diagnosed, yet mysterious 
condition which, like menstrual cramps and breech births, afflict only women.  There is 
considerable evidence that the diagnosis was handed out freely (not to mention unethically) by 
Victorian doctors unsure of how to handle the complaints of female patients – and their 
husbands.  The medical community has not recognized “hysteria” as an official diagnosis for 
decades, yet allusions to the illness persist, and the phrase “hysterical woman” brings a vivid 
picture to mind: she is a female beyond reason, something of an animal, and irrational.  Whether 
intentional or not, Beauvoir’s allusions to animal behavior being the basis of men’s perception of 
women is clever, and made more so by her dissection of Freud’s views toward women.   
Beauvoir has, at this point, defined woman at her basis.  The fundamental biology of the 
woman leads neatly to the woman’s role as a sexual creature and it is through a woman’s own 
sexual conquests that her other roles become apparent: wife and mother, and the definition of 
being existent seems farther than ever from the feminist grasp.  What seemingly and frequently 
gets lost in Beauvoir’s reflective feminism is that at no time is she ever issuing a call to arms, per 
se; instead, Beauvoir adroitly provides an existentialist “primer” intended to allow a woman to 
quietly acknowledge her “place” through the definition by the masculine tongue, in order to 
better understand her role and thus: master it in her own way.     
Hegel: Master and Slave  
 Having defined women with the use of “Other,” Beauvoir delves into the roles women 
experience.  Beauvoir relies heavily on Darwinism and survival of the species in explaining 
masculine behavior:  men, by their natures, conquer and master their environments.  Women’s 
role in this respect is also relegated to that of “Other.”  Women are not active participants in 
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battle, but find their place before and after.  There is utility in each role, however; biology makes 
man incidental to the species: his role is to “remodel” the earth, while women are tasked with 
“tending” (64).  Beauvoir believes that Hegel’s analogy of master and slave perfectly applies to 
men and women.  Beauvoir quotes Hegel directly: “The other consciousness is the dependent 
consciousness for who the essential reality is the animal type of life; that is to say, a mode of 
being bestowed by another entity” (64).  Man has not only defined women, but also neatly 
delineated her parameters.  Within Beauvoir’s historical scope, the statement captures the limited 
role of women.  Although women make up a significant part of the workforce and enjoy a greater 
freedom today than they certainly did in Beauvoir’s time, there remains a double-standard in 
effect that might never completely fade: women balance home and work, while no such 
expectation exists wholly for men.  This speaks to Beauvoir’s summation of the reality that 
males have constructed for females:  
He it is who opens up the future to which she also reaches out.  In truth women 
have never set up female values in opposition to male values; it is man who, 
desirous of maintaining masculine prerogatives have invented that divergence.  
Men have presumed to create a feminine domain – the kingdom of life, of 
immanence – only in order to lock up women therein.  (65) 
Further, she points out that women have never asked to be recognized as existents and equals.  
Interestingly, Beauvoir provides this prescription which, on its surface, seems easily done.  Yet 
within a patriarchy, little evidence exists to suggest that this would be so.  While Beauvoir is 
recommending women recognize their inherent power, it is rather short-sighted to assume that 
women of that time – or any other – could simply ask and receive true equality to men and on 
their own merit as human beings. One would presume that Beauvoir, simply by her stature as a 
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feminist icon, might enjoy a measure of this respect; ironically though, Beauvoir is frequently 
cast as “lesser” to her partner, Jean Paul Sartre.   
Sartre & Beauvoir 
 Beauvoir met Sartre during her “practice teaching” required for her degrees and 
certifications in philosophy through the French university system (Bair 136).  Sartre, an 
existentialist himself, is notable for On Being and Nothingness.  Sartre may well have been the 
seminal influence on Beauvoir’s work and life.  Though never legally married, the two shared an 
unconventional, “open” sexual relationship, where each enjoyed relationships with others as they 
saw fit.  There seems to be little evidence of the friction one would expect in such a relationship.  
Rather, as the subject of Sartre seems to arise in every facet of every interview Beauvoir granted 
– even those presumably meant to be about her own work.  However, she remains matter-of-fact 
whether discussing Sartre, herself or the nature of their partnership.  This might well be 
expected, for Beauvoir and Sartre might well be considered, in the modern vernacular, a “power 
couple.”  Though Beauvoir is always careful to stress her field was literary – not philosophical, 
to Simons she states that she and Sartre read and critiqued each others’ work.  When asked of 
Sartre’s reaction to her opinions, Beauvoir said, “He did what I told him to do. When I told him 
that the first version of The Respectful Prostitute was very bad, he completely rewrote it” (337).  
Beauvoir insisted that same held true for Sartre’s criticisms of her own writing.  It seems that 
theirs was a true partnership in every sense.   
 Yet for all of Beauvoir’s own reputation, Sartre cast a constant shadow in her life and 
over her work.  Simons, without any obvious guile, asked Beauvoir during the 1979 interview if 
her ideas of woman were purely her [Beauvoir’s] own or if, as it sometimes appeared to Simons, 
they had come from Sartre.  Beauvoir responded with an emphatic “Oh! No! Absolutely not” 
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(338).  According to Beauvoir, Sartre had no interest in women (from a “rights” standpoint,) and 
her ideas were solely her own.   One might wonder if it is admirably brave or foolish to intimate 
to Beauvoir that her ideas came from a man, but it illustrates both the principle of “Other” that 
Beauvoir uses to define woman, as well as the common misconception that, as the woman, 
Beauvoir was necessarily subservient to Sartre.  Beauvoir is clear on Sartre’s influence on her: as 
a philosopher, she considered him brilliant and she learned from him.  By the same token, she 
maintains he learned from her (Bair 148).  Beauvoir seems fiercely protective of her own 
autonomy, as well as the integrity of her work: “…when I wrote my memoirs… when I wrote my 
novels, I was never influenced by Sartre because I was writing from my lived and felt 
experiences” (Simons 339).  Though Simons continued to push Beauvoir to admit Sartre’s hand 
in her writing, Beauvoir remained dispassionately adamant that her work was her own.   
 In light of this, we can recall Beauvoir urging women to assert their rights to be 
considered “equal” to men.  Something of a conundrum exists in simply acknowledging that a 
gulf exists between women and men based on, as Beauvoir defines it, mere biology and how one 
is what the other is not.  Beauvoir spent much of her life insisting and claiming possession of her 
own work against the ever-present Sartre (an irony which becomes heavier when we realize they 
never shared the same living quarters). Published in 1949, The Second Sex was written twenty 
years into her unconventional partnering with Sartre, yet questions about his contributions to her 
thoughts persisted until her death in 1986 and unfortunately, it seems as though speculation will 
always remain.   
Beauvoir does not seem to have been too terribly put out by these questions.   One does 
not find anecdotes of her reacting angrily or even particularly fiercely.  With a simple aplomb, 
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she asserted her ownership of the work and redirected Simons.  Beauvoir evinces precisely what 
she has exhorted women to do in Sex: live as though you are not other.     
Because she is a woman, Beauvoir’s work – as well as her actions – rings true; she attains 
a meta-understanding of not only the implications of womanhood, but also becomes something 
of an example – an honorific she might shrug off.  Beauvoir, for all the praise heaped upon her, 
comes off as a genuinely modest and unassuming individual in others’ recollections.  Throughout 
the interview with Simons, her tone is matter-of-fact and she is quick to give Sartre the credit he 
is due.  It would be a mistake, however, to assume that when she notes Sartre’s brilliance or how 
much she has learned from him she does so because he is a man or because they have been 
intimately involved for most of their lives.  Ultimately, Beauvoir’s respect is based on the idea 
that human beings – regardless of gender – deserve credit and blame as circumstances warrant.  
We may erroneously see Sex as a “feminist manifesto,” when in truth, Beauvoir is simply 
commenting on being human. Her perceptions are truly gender-blind.   
 The same courtesy though, as we have seen, is sometimes denied to Beauvoir purely on 
the basis of her sex, as it is often perceived that Sartre is the puppet-master working her strings 
on the other side of the curtain.  This, of course, does her a great disservice by fundamentally 
discounting her considerable intellect.  However, Beauvoir is certainly not the first woman to 
endure this bias.   
The Woman’s Condition 
Beauvoir points out, “the antifeminists obtain from the study of history two contradictory 
arguments: (1) women have never created anything great; and (2) the situation of women has 
never presented the flowering of great feminine personalities” (133).  While Beauvoir takes 
exception to this notion based on the idea that the few are not sufficient to determine the 
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collective, one might note a deeper problem at the core: throughout history, women have done 
great deeds.  However, recording history had been, for quite some time, the sole purview of 
males.   
In researching the conditions of women in the ancient world, particularly Rome, one 
finds a wealth of sources and an abundance of notable, laudable women – yet very little evidence 
of the woman’s life exists as written in her own words.  In 42 A.D., Hortensia, daughter of the 
great Roman orator, Q Hortensius, addressed the Roman Senate on the unfair tax burden 
triumvirs placed upon the families of legions in the field.  The speech, in its entirety, was 
recorded for both its erudition and passion – and possibly because women were forbidden to 
address the bar.  In recording it, historian Valerius Maximus, noted that the speech was good and 
should be saved, making certain to point out that a woman had spoken the words – something of 
a conceit, given the nature of Roman naming customs.  Women of ancient Rome were all named 
for their clan and pater-familia affiliation – hence, the profusion of females named “Julia” and 
“Claudia” in the Julio-Claudian line.  Thus, Hortensia’s gender was already a matter of record 
once her name was entered; reinforcing the fact was redundant (Best; qtd. Mosier-Dubinsky 10).  
From this vantage point, it is impossible to conscientiously take point one seriously.  In 
the span of time since Sex was published, women have certainly done great things.  Further, one 
of the key elements of feminism in a modern sense is the idea of giving women choices – and to 
support those choices.  The infighting between women apropos the validity of  choosing “career” 
over “mother” is weirdly fascinating in the same way Erica Jong commenting on Monica 
Lewinsky’s gums is – and in the same way Margaret Simons pressing Simone De Beauvoir to 
admit Sartre’s imagined puppetry is: feminism should transcend gender and allow women the 
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same freedom of choice that men have enjoyed for centuries (and you can be certain that no one 
ever noted that Mark Antony was male when he addressed the Senate after Caesar’s murder). 
Beauvoir’s second point, however, proves problematic, because it does point to 
something deeply rooted in patriarchal societies, and to certain extent, exists to this day.  Though 
women are in integral part of the workforce today, they are still at a distinct disadvantage.  
Women, on average, are paid less than men, and women are sometimes seen as “riskier” 
investments to a company, given the nature of pregnancy.  This is by no means universal, but to 
pretend it has been completely eradicated is foolishness.  Moreover, the wholesale discounting of 
“men” as a group is well avoided, too.  Men – as much as women – are the product of their 
environments.  Attitudes are changing on a larger scale than ever before, but women’s 
environments have not allowed for lateral success to that of men.  
On the Myth of Woman 
 From the first, as we’ve seen Beauvoir note that it is the simple fact of differing biology 
that separates the genders.  This basis permeates all of existence, then; both the male and the 
female see the broad-stroked, literary portrayal of women and often confuse the fantasy of fiction 
with reality.  Beauvoir catalogs the “myth” in real life as both static, with allusions to Platonic 
forms in the “Eternal Feminine”; and the fluid, ever-changing myth of woman (253).   
 To Beauvoir, the Eternal Feminine exists only within our minds and, “…projects into the 
realm of Platonic ideas a reality that is directly experienced or is conceptualized on a basis of 
experience, in place of fact, value, significance, knowledge, empirical law; it substitutes a 
transcendental Idea, timeless, unchangeable, unnecessary.”  Further, Beauvoir notes that the 
concept of an Eternal Feminine is irrefutable since it is largely comprised of what is “immutable 
truth” (253).  In the same way that Plato held each and every object to exist in the intelligible 
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realm in perfect forms, Beauvoir believes that the fantasy of the “perfect woman” would exist 
there, as well; this standard is what both men and women envision the Eternal Feminine.  While 
the details and characterization might change over time and between cultures, Eternal Feminine 
is the “yardstick” used to judge women.  The problem, of course, is that living women tend to 
disappoint when held to perfection (through no fault of their own, of course), but the 
pervasiveness of this ideal further separates the sexes and damages women: “[to] pose as Woman 
[Eternal Feminine] is to pose the absolute Other, without reciprocity, denying against all 
experience that she is a subject, a fellow human being” (253).   In simple language, women are 
separate (“Other”) to men, but further a divide amongst themselves when competing with an 
imagined ideal.   
 In reality, women vary greatly from one another in any number of aspects – from their 
body shape to their hair color.  This is true from an emotional and temperamental standpoint, as 
well.  However, the simple presence of similarity in their reproductive system makes them the 
same in both their own eyes and the eyes of men.  Beauvoir, however, may have touched on 
what, exactly, has allowed the beauty industry to rake in billions of dollars of profit annually: 
there has always been an ideal, there is an ideal, and there will be an ideal of “woman” – with 
women’s permission, of course.  In the same way we might simply ask for our rights, women 
might also refuse to play along with the idea of the Eternal Feminine.  Beauvoir concedes, 
however, that the notion of Eternal Feminine saturates societies, and escaping its influence 
requires something from within.   
 While the so-called “static myth” of the Eternal Feminine is damaging, the more fluid 
myths that women live with are just as bad.  Beauvoir lists what we can consider feminine 
archetypes: the virgin, the mother, the whore, the crone.  Each mythical woman has what 
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Beauvoir calls an antonym, or opposite, and “… [the] saintly mother has for correlative the cruel 
stepmother, the angelic young girl has the perverse virgin” (254). Thus we split each fluid myth 
into subsets and in this way further typify women by aspect.  The true nature of these myths, as 
Beauvoir sees them, are that they fulfill a dangerous proposition for women, for their use – by 
both men and women – justify any treatment to women. As she opines, “Few myths have been 
more advantageous to the ruling caste than the myth of woman: it justifies all privileges and 
authorizes all abuse” (255).   
The Female Cogito 
 Though Beauvoir sees women and men as sharing equally in the culpability of embracing 
the myths of womanhood, the concept of the “feminine mystery,” as she terms it, seems to 
appeal more the male.  Perhaps quaintly, Beauvoir notes that a woman, by her nature is not one 
for mystery (259); this is a construct that has been forced upon her by a male domination.  One 
might surmise, however, that the nature of a woman’s body in which her reproductive organs are, 
unlike a man’s, secreted away lends itself to an air of the unknown.  Further, for centuries, 
female fertility and ovulation remained inexplicable, and birth control options were often limited 
to the ineffective means of luck, chance, wriggling, and the invocation of mercy from a favored 
god.  The woman’s physical anatomy is once again at the root of her separation, but men see the 
“mystery,” according to Beauvoir, as something else yet to be conquered – though menses and 
childbirth are often distasteful to males (259).   
 Beauvoir believes the idea of feminine mystery is further based, in part, on the idea that 
“womanly knowledge” is willfully withheld (259).  Coupled with the lack of solid, working 
knowledge of the mechanics of conception, this makes sense; up until relatively recently, women 
were given more credit than their due with respect to the mechanics of conception, often 
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“blamed” for infertility and erroneously thought to determine the sex of the fertilized embryo.  
Though Beauvoir is willing to concede that biologically, yes: woman is “Other,” she balks 
entirely at the notion that the feminine mind is somehow intrinsically different from that of a 
man.  In denying Descartes’ Cogito and building it directly into the myth of womanhood 
(whether static or fluid,) Beauvoir sees the feminine mystery as, indeed, a mystery, for “…it 
would be a mystery in itself from the fact that it would be mystery for itself; it would be 
Absolute mystery” (259).   
 Because the feminine myths prove useful to men we can account for their perpetuation 
over time and through generations.  To Beauvoir’s eye, the genesis of the myth is purely an 
invention of man in an effort to continue slotting woman as “Other.” We might note that, while 
masculine archetypes exist, rarely do they convey the same messages as their female 
counterparts.  The male ne’er-do-wells are most often portrayed as dangerous, but wholly 
masculine and seductive.  In the case of the feminine, the “bad girl” as confident and comfortable 
in her sexuality is a relatively new development, yet is often still interpreted with a sense that she 
is obligated to feel some sort of shame.  Cliché though it may be, if a man is ambitious, he is 
driven to succeed; a woman in similar circumstance is merely a “bitch.”   
Woman as Womb 
 “In maternity,” Beauvoir writes, “a woman fulfills her physiological destiny… since her 
whole organic structure is adapted for the perpetuation of the species” (484).  The whole of 
Beauvoir’s interpretation of feminism balances on the crucial component of the biological 
differences between men and women.  Beauvoir’s discussion of “The Mother” should not be 
confused with the myth or archetype of the mother as previously discussed.  Instead, Beauvoir is 
arguing the pressure to be a mother which is exerted on women.  Beauvoir and Sartre did not 
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have children together, nor did she feel a particularly overwhelming urge toward motherhood.  
At no point does Beauvoir sneer at the agency of motherhood, though; like anything else she 
discusses as being typically “female,” the wrong approach is only through societal (or masculine) 
compulsion.   
 In light of the introduction of reliable contraceptive methods in the mid-part of the 
twentieth century, Beauvoir’s discussion on methods of birth control in her own time (484) 
seems charmingly antiquated. Likely, though she is not specific, she is referring to methods akin 
to those of birth control advocate, Margaret Sanger.  Sanger, who founded Planned Parenthood, 
studied world-wide birth control methods searching for effective means of family planning.  
While the withdrawal and douching methods advised by Sanger proved more effective than the 
simple guessing and orally-ingested herbal concoctions often previously favored by women, they 
were by no means reliable or fool-proof. However, Sanger offered a step in the direction of 
woman mastering her biology.    
 Beauvoir sees birth control as such: woman is no longer a slave to her ovaries, and 
neither is she asked to forgo her pleasure to avoid impregnation.  However, Beauvoir also notes 
that patriarchy – notably naming the Catholic faith (484) – insists on instilling shame within 
women for taking any sort of steps toward contraception.  Beauvoir’s point is that man’s 
biological imperative is to reproduce and woman is the only vessel available.   
 With the questionable efficacy of available contraceptive methods, abortion in Beauvoir’s 
time could be considered a means of birth control.  There is nothing to suggest that women made 
such decisions lightly nor should we assume its use proves its acceptance.  Instead, the 
termination of a pregnancy was simply the way out once a couple had been, as Beauvoir puts it, 
“caught.”  She notes hypocrisy inherent to abortions: an author might rhapsodize for pages about 
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childbirth, but the mention of an abortion will surely have him accused of “wallowing in filth” 
(485), because abortions then (as now,) prove to be polarizing.   
 There is an inherent unfairness to the issue of reproductive rights.  The burden of 
preventing pregnancy has often fallen on the woman.  With the outbreak of the AIDS virus in the 
1980s, a disease most commonly spread by sexual intercourse and the exchange of bodily fluids, 
for the first time, men were encouraged to take an active and responsible role in their sexual 
relationships. Condoms, which are reasonably effective in protecting against AIDS and other 
sexually transmitted diseases, prove to be remarkably effective as well in preventing pregnancy – 
though this seemed incidental in most of the marketing campaigns aimed at men.  More often, 
advertisements emphasized that the use of condoms was something a man could do in order to 
ensure he’d stay healthy enough to continue having sex; the onus of preventing babies remained 
on the woman.  Abstinence, as we have been told, is the only method of birth control that is 
100% effective 100% of the time.  The impracticality of this position tends to fall on deaf ears 
often though; given that sex is a biological drive within us.   
 Women are at a distinct disadvantage, Beauvoir notes.  Not only do the “rules” claim she 
must not be overtly sexual lest she be shamed, she has no choice but to acquiesce to the man’s 
more “legitimate” drives. The result of this imbalance is enforced motherhood,  according to 
Beauvoir, wherein “wretched infants [are brought into this world] whom their parents will be 
unable to support and who will become the victims of public care.” Further, she rails that a 
“society that will fight for the rights of an embryo shows little care once it is born” (485). 
Prescience aside, Beauvoir is making a very real point about the way a woman’s body is used to 
subjugate and trap her.  But a woman’s sole purpose it to bear children, and the woman who 
chooses not to – once or ever – is vilified and reviled, and made to feel that she has failed as a 
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woman.  In something close to a full circle, Beauvoir’s original simplistic definition seems 
prophetic: a woman is a womb, an ovary, and because of that, she is the Hegelian “Other” set 
against man and his wishes.   
Conclusion 
The language of existentialism is, in fact, the only approach that proves useful in 
approaching a discussion of feminism, and particularly, the existentialist feminism of Simone De 
Beauvoir.  While her influences and interests tended toward an existential view, she does not 
force or bend the struggle for equality for women into that particular mold.  Instead, she 
rightfully sees the connection between the feminine experience and the necessity of taking 
responsibility.  Beauvoir’s sole point is not simply that woman should ask to be equal; instead, 
she advocates a woman approaching her life as if she simply is – something Beauvoir evinced for 
herself, proving the possibility.  In The Second Sex, noted philosopher and feminist Simone De 
Beauvoir used the Hegelian term “other” to cut to the heart of the feminine psyche, and 
Beauvoir’s existentialist purview has been adopted by modern feminists in part because the 
language of existentialism perfectly conveys the female struggle for equality.  
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